Abstract-There have been extensive studies on RFID security, in particular authentication and privacy issues. In most protocols, the discussions focus on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for tracing or identification, and the access to data stored on RFID is enforced through authentication. Recently, there rise interests of using RFID tags as distributed storage, e.g., storing floorplans which can be used by fire fighters during emergencies. In this paper, we propose a scheme that provides fine-grained access to data stored on RFID tags. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that addresses security issues in this new type of RFID applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been a boom in deploying Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags in different fields, e.g., electronic toll collection and contact-less passports [4] . Most protocols proposed so far focus on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for the purpose of identification and tracing. Recently, there is a rising interest of using RFID tags as distributed storage [7] , [10] so as to retrieve information related to a component, e.g., its status instead of only its identification, in real-time, due to the benefit of convenient wireless management.
The wide usages of RFID have lead to extensive studies on RFID security, in particular authentication [11] , [20] and privacy [12] , [2] issues. In these security solutions, access control to the data stored on a RFID tag is enforced through authentication. In most cases, the tag only stores very limited information about the product (e.g., a unique product ID), which is not sufficient to complete a task. Therefore, we have to refer to a centralized database to obtain more detailed information about the product to which the RFID tag is attached.
The centralized solution works well in many applications, e.g., books management in libraries [14] and patient and staff tracking in hospitals [13] . However, the effectiveness of this solution highly relies on the availability of an online centralized database. Thus, a major problem of this solution is the single-point-of-failure. In addition, if an adversary could compromise the centralized database, all the confidential data stored on this database are disclosed or modified. Moreover, the centralized solution may result in a delay in the completion of certain tasks, which is not suitable for scenarios that have real-time requirements.
Historically, the choice of the centralized solution is mainly due to the limited memory size of the first generation RFID tags. Nowadays, the memory size of a RFID tag (in particular an active tag) is large enough to hold the information on the tag itself. For example, IDENTEC SOLUTIONS's i-Q32T active UHF tag has a memory size of 32 KBytes [18] . The advance in RFID storage technologies makes it possible to use a RFID tag as a small local data storage, and thus greatly broadens the industrial usages of RFID tags, e.g., building management and indoor navigation [16] . On the other hand, in spite of the increase of the storage capacity of RFID tags, any method that can improve the cost/storage efficiency is still highly desirable. In terms of data management, therefore, we allow data used for different purposes/services to be stored on the same tag to maximize the usage of the RFID storage.
A major security concern about this new types of RFID applications is data protection, including both confidentiality and integrity. Current solutions based on authentication are vulnerable to physical attacks [23] , since RFID tags are installed at open areas. Therefore, data should be encrypted not only during the communication between a RFID tag and a RFID reader but also when they are stored on the tag.
In our applications, different parts of the data may be accessible only to a specific set of users, and sometimes the data stored on a tag may belong to multiple owners, who do not have full trusts on each other. Therefore, a naïve solution that encrypts all the data with a single key does not work. A possible solution is to assign each specific set of users (or say role) a shared key and then encrypt all the data accessible to a role with its corresponding key. However, this method is workable only when the data accessible to any pair of roles are totally disjointed, and is unsuitable for the scenarios in which the data accessible to a pair of roles are overlapped 1 . In the latter, multiple ciphertexts corresponding to the overlapped data are generated and stored. Apparently, it leads to poor storage efficiency. Moreover, the extension of generating a specific key for the overlapped data is infeasible due to the key management issue.
To address these challenges, in this paper, we propose the first scheme that provides efficient data protection in the RFID-based Distributed Storage (RDS) applications. Our contributions include:
• To ensure data confidentiality and integrity, we employ multi-level encryption together with role-based access control on the data stored on a RFID tag. In our scheme, although any user can download the data stored on a tag, the protection of the data relies on the key(s) that is/are assigned to the user instead of the on-tag authentication mechanism. A user can only access the part of data that she/he is authorized according to her/his role and the Access Control Policy (ACP).
• Previous definitions of simple access control policy (simple XACP) and complex access control policy (complex XACP) are inaccurate [5] . In this paper, we redefine these two terms in terms of data publishing.
• We design an algorithm that determine the exact type of the ACP, simple or complex. This output can be used as a guidance for the selection of a storage-efficient encryption method.
• Notice that previous cryptography-based solutions to complex access control policies are considered problematic [5] , we propose a solution to this issue. In this paper, we focus on the case that the data stored on a RFID tag is represented in XML [21] , although the proposed scheme and algorithms can be readily extended to support other types of data representations. In addition, although we focus on the RFID-based distributed storage applications in this paper, the proposed scheme and algorithms can be used for access control on data publishing in general, in particular when there is a concern about the storage efficiency.
II. THE SYSTEM MODEL OF OUR DESIGN

A. A Motivating Example
In this section, we motivate our design by presenting a scenario that RFID tags are employed as distributed storages. The following example is based on an on-going project at Concordia University that aims at providing real-time services to fire fighters.
During fire emergencies, it is critical for fire fighters to accurately identify their positions in the building in realtime and obtain detailed and up-to-date information about the circumstances. The availability of such information directly affects the correctness of the decision that fire fighters make and the effectiveness of operations that they undertake. Currently, upon arrival in the fire site, the fire fighters are given a set of floor plans of the building, including special symbols about the location of chemical, hazard material, etc. There are several problems in this solution. First, a fire fighter has to identify the position of the floorplan, move to that place, and then find the fire source. However, it may not be easy to complete all these tasks efficiently during a fire emergency due to time pressure. Besides, these floorplans may include certain confidential information (e.g., hazard chemical materials) which adds additional security concerns with handling these documents. An alternative solution is to maintain the floorplans of all the buildings in the city at the fire station. Hence, whenever the fire station receives a fire alarm from a specific building, the corresponding floorplan is loaded to fire fighters' portable devices (e.g., a PDA) before departure. This solution does not provide real-time positioning within a building. Another issue is the overhead of keeping all the floorplans maintained at the fire station up-to-date.
To address the weaknesses of current solutions, we use RFID tags as the media storing the floorplans. Owe to the convenience of wireless communications, a fire fighter can readily download the floorplan and display it on the portable device, when the tag is within a certain range. There has been research work and ongoing activities in standardizing the representation of floorplans in a specific format, e.g., XML [19] . Detailed discussions about this issue is out of the scope of this paper. Moreover, upon receiving the signals from multiple tags, the fire fighter can identify his/her current position and the path to point-of-interests. Details about indoor navigation are beyond the scope of this paper.
We notice that, there is still a problem remained in the above solution, i.e., providing a detailed floorplan to fire fighters while at the same time preserving the confidentiality of certain private information.
B. The System and Adversary Model
We assume that the structure of the XML document and the corresponding XML Access Control Policy (XACP) are changed infrequently. We also assume that there exists a trusted data provider, who is responsible for providing various services using RFID-based distributed storage. In addition, we assume that an XACP has been defined to control the access to different parts of data stored on the RFID tags. Thus, the goal of our work is to derive a data protection scheme that can strictly enforce this XACP and at the same time minimize the storage. Further, we assume that the XACP is defined in terms of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [8] .
We assume that an adversary can be an outsider or a user who is assigned with one or a specific set of roles according to the XACP. We also assume that the adversary has certain capabilities of launching a physical attack [23] so as to obtain the content stored on a RFID tag, even if the tag is protected by an authentication scheme.
III. THE PROCEDURE OF DATA ENCRYPTION
The whole procedure of data encryption consists of the following steps: access tree generation, policy type checking, access tree transformation, key generation, and XML encryption. Among them, the access tree transformation step is optional, and it is applied only when the XACP is identified as a complex XML ACP through the policy type checking step.
A. Access Tree Generation
The inputs of this step include the original XML document, which is expected to be protected while providing services to the authorized users, and the corresponding XACP. The basic idea is to compress a connected part of the original XML tree structure that are accessible by the same set of roles into a single node. The output is called an Access Tree. Due to its hierarchical nature, an XML document can be represented as non-cyclic directed tree T = (N, B) where N is the set of all the nodes N = {n 1 , . . . , n n } in T and B is the set of all the branches B = {b 1 , . . . , b m } in T . In our context, the XACP is represented with a set of subjectobject relations, where subject is a role and object is a set of elements within the XML document that are accessible to this role. In the context of T = (N, B) , we define the following notations:
• P rnt(n i , T) is defined as the parent node of n i in T.
• Chld(n i , T ) is defined as the set of all the children nodes of n i in T .
• T ni is defined as a subtree of T , the root node of which is n i .
• n root denotes the root node of T . For simplicity we will use P rnt(n i ) and Chld(n i ) for node n i in T , instead of P rnt(n i , T) and Chld(n i , T ), in the remained part of this paper.
Let R = {R 1 , . . . , R r } denote the set of all the roles defined in the XACP. Let {R i , N i } denote a subject-object relation, where R i is a specific role in R and
is the set of nodes in T that are accessible to users assigned with role R i . Taking T as the input, we mark each node of T (denoted as n i ) with a set containing the roles that can access this node, which is called the Role Set of node n i and is denoted as M (n i ).
After all the nodes are marked, a search is performed from the root of T , i.e., AT G(T, n root ). At each step of the search, the marking set of the current node n i , i.e., M i , is compared to that of the next node n j , i.e., M j . If M i = M j , the branch between n i and n j is removed, and n j is merged into n i . At the end of this depth-first-search, the access tree corresponding to T is generated.
For example, the tree structure of an XML document D is shown in Figure 2 . Given that, there are four roles involved in the XACP of D, denoted as R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , and R 4 . The detailed access information about each role is shown in Table I . The step of access tree generation is shown in Figure 3 . 
A, B, D, E, I, J, K, L R 2 A, C, F, G, H R 3 A, B, C, D, E, G, I, J, L R 4 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L
B. Policy Type Checking
Previous work on XML access control [15] , [5] focuses on scenarios where data access can be defined with a simple access control policy (simple XACP). In addition, previous definitions of simple XACPs and complex XACPs are inaccurate, and thus fail to draw a clear line between them. Therefore, we redefine these two terms as follows. Given an access tree, Algorithm 1 is executed to determine the exact type of the associated XACP, simple or complex. Let N A be the set of all the nodes in the acces tree T A . if n i is not the root node of T A then 4: if M (n i ) M (P rnt(n i )) then
Algorithm 1 Policy Type Checking
5:
Type ← Complex 6: end if 7: end if 8: end for 9: return Type
We continue with the example in Section III-A with a small change, namely, adding a new role R 5 which can access node A, C, D. Figure 4 shows the process of access tree generation for this new XACP. In Figure 4 , the role set of node D is not a subset of that of its parent node, i.e., node B. Thus, this new XACP is complex.
C. Access Tree Transformation
We observe that, in general tree structure encryption, to encrypt a node literally means to encrypt only the content of that particular node. Contrarily, in XML encryption [22] , to encrypt a node n i means to encrypt both n i and all its child nodes, i.e., T ni . As a result, in terms of a complex XACP, it is impossible to perform multi-level encryption according to the hierarchical structure of the access tree.
To address this issue, the original XML document has to be transformed in such a way that, the XACP enforced on the transformed document, which is equivalent to the complex XACP enforced on the original document, is a simple XACP. The transformation can be done through either copying or moving certain part of the document to another position. In RFID-based distributed storage applications, we are more concerned about storage efficiency. Hence, our transformation algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, involves only moving operations. In terms of the complex XACP example described in Section III-B, the resulting transformed access tree is shown in Figure 5 .
D. Role Key Generation and Multi-Level Encryption
To reduce the key management overhead, it is desirable that each role needs to maintain a minimum number of keys. Based on the scheme proposed by Akl and Taylor [1] , Crampton presented a method that applies hierarchical and role-based access control to XML documents in terms of simple XACP that focuses on Internet data outsourcing applications [5] . In our scheme, through identifying complex policies and making appropriate transformations, Crampton's scheme can
Input: The access tree T A corresponding to T Output: The transformed access tree T
Done ← false 8: while n M is not the root node of T A and Done = false do 9:
Add n T to Chld(n N )
13:
Done ← true 14: else 15 :
end if 17: end while 18: end if 19: end if be applied to the resulting access tree, no matter which type of access control policy needs to be enforced on the original XML document.
Take the resulting access tree in Figure 5 as an example. After further simplification through combining leaf nodes that share the same parent node and have the same role set, the resulting policy hierarchy and key hierarchy corresponding to T T are shown in Figure 6 . Each role R i needs to maintain only one key, i.e., k i . Different parts of the document that are accessible to users with Role R i can be decrypted by either k i or other keys derived from k i . Due to the limit of space, the full process of role key generation cannot be covered in this paper. The readers are referred to [5] for more details. Afterwards, we can encrypt the XML document in a similar way as [15] with these role keys. For example, node G is encrypted with k(G), k(C), and k(A) in sequence.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The RFID tags used in our experiments are based on Intelligent Long Range (ILR) technology provided by IDENTEC SOLUTIONS. We make use of two types of RFID tags (i-D and i-Q), which share common properties. i-D tags can be detected by mobile reader unit up to 6m away and has memory up to 64 bytes whereas i-Q tags have range up to 100m and have memory as big as 32KB.
As shown in Table II , three types of encryption modes are implemented in our experiments. In Table II , XML-Enc and Std-Enc denote XML Encryption [22] and standard encryption, respectively. For XML encryption, we use a java implementation of Apache XML Project [9] that follows the W3C recommendation [22] and uses AES with 128-bit keys.
In our preliminary experiments, we encrypt an XML document with the structure shown in Figure 2 in two distinct ways so as to conform to the simple XACP shown in Table I and the complex XACP described in Section III-B, respectively. In either case, we assign an equal amount of data to each node in the document, and then increase this amount gradually until the whole RFID tag is full, i.e., 32 KB. Moreover, we assume that all the encryptions performed on this document use the same cryptographic algorithm (e.g., AES) and are with the same parameters (e.g., 128-bit key size).
In Figure 7 and Figure 8 , we show the percentage of increase from the original XML document to the encrypted one under three encryption modes, given that the access control enforced by the encryption conforms to the required simple or complex XACPs, respectively. In both figures, the increase of the document size after encryption in Mode I is much higher than that of Mode II or Mode III. It is mainly due to the fact that, in XML encryption, clear text uses 8-bits per character (UTF-8), while the ciphertext is represented using 6-bits per character (base64). When the ciphertext encoding is converted from base64 to ASCII, there is a 33% increases of the size. Even worse, such an increase is compounded in multi-level encryption, which results in a large percentage of increase just after a few levels' encryption. To lower down the encryption overhead, in Mode II we employ standard encryption, where there is no conversion of the ciphertext encoding.
To further improve the storage efficiency, in Mode III we remove repeated encryption tags. As a result, only the outermostlevel encryption tag is retained. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that the percentage of increase in Mode III are from 2.8% to 20% under the simple XACP and from 4.2% to 18% under the complex XACP, respectively. According to our experiments, Mode III is the best option for encrypting the XML document. There has been extensive research in RFID security [12] , [2] , [11] , [20] . In most protocols, the discussions focus on scenarios that RFID tags are used mainly for tracing or identification, and the access to data stored on RFID is enforced through authentication. Unfortunately, such mechanisms are unsuitable for the new type of applications discussed in this paper, in which the actual data are stored distributed on the RFID tags instead of the back-end database. To best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that investigates security issues, in particular access control, in this new type of applications. A research topic that is tightly relevant to our work is secure data publishing of XML documents over the Internet. Many XML access control models have been proposed so far [6] , [15] , [5] , [3] , [17] . There are two major barriers of directly applying these solutions to the RFID-based distributed storage applications. One is the limitation on the storage. For example, the work done by Miklau and Suciu [15] generates many metanodes which increases the size of original document. Another weakness of this work is that users may have to maintain multiple keys. The other barrier is the absence of an online trusted server that enforces the XACP. In addition, previous cryptographic-based solution [5] focuses on scenarios with simple XACPs, and there is a lack of detailed discussions and feasible solutions, given that there is no online trusted server, for scenarios with complex XACPs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we indicated that there are increasing interests of using RFID tags as distributed storage and proposed the first work that investigates security issues, in particular access control, in this new type of RFID-based applications. We proposed a scheme for protecting data stored on RFID tags, which are based on role-based access control and multilevel encryption. In addition, a more accurate definition of simple/complex XACP is given, together with an algorithm for determining the type of a specific XACP. Moreover, we presented the first workable cryptographic-based method that can handle complex XACP cases without helps from an online trusted server. It is done through transforming the original document and converting the complex XACP problem to a simple XACP problem.
